ABSTRACT: For Kant's interpretation of Zeno in KrV A502-507/B530-535, scholars have usually referred to Plato's Phaedrus (261d); in reality the sources Kant uses are, on one hand, Brucker (who depends in turn on the pseudo-Aristotelian De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia,, and, on the other, Plato's Parmenides (135e6-136b1) and Proclus' commentary on it, as quoted by Gassendi in a popular textbook he wrote on the history of logic.
7 Cf. ARISTOTLE, De interpretatione, 17b16-26; on Kant's dependence on Aristotle concerning this particular point, see BERTI, E. Contraddizione e dialettica negli antichi e nei moderni, Palermo, 1987, p. 124-126, 169-172 ; on Aristotle's theory of the kinds of opposition between propositions, see WHITAKER, C.W.A. Aristotle's De interpretatione. Contradiction and Dialectic, Oxford, 1996, p. 83-94 . In his lessons on logic, Kant takes up the doctrine, of Aristotelian derivation and subsequently developed by the Scholastic tradition, which he could find in the manuals of logic he made use of (see MEIER, Vernunftlehre, Halle, 1752, § § 377-380; Id., Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Halle, 1752, § § 342-345) and which concerns the different types of opposition between propositions, distinguishing for example in the Logik Jäsche (IX, between inferences of the understanding per judicia contradictorie opposita (where "in consequence of the principle of the excluded middle, the two contradicting judgements cannot both be true, and just as little can they both be false; if the one is true, then the other is false, and conversely"), inferences per judicia contrarie opposita (where "only the inference from the truth of the one to the falsehood of the other holds, but non conversely"), and inferences per judicia subcontrarie opposita (where "if one of these propositions is false the other is true, but not conversely"); cf. also Refl. zur Logik 3168-3178, XVI, p. 691-698; Logik Blomberg [1771] , XXIV, p. 281-2; Wiener Logik [early 1780], XXIV, p. 938-939; Logik Dohna-Wundlacken [1792 -1793 , XXIV, […] if one regards the two propositions, "The world is infinite in magnitude", "The world is finite in magnitude", as contradictory opposites, then one assumes that the world (the whole series of appearances) is a thing in itself. For the world remains, even though I may rule out the infinite or finite regress in the series of its appearances. But if I take away this presupposition, [...] and deny that the world is a thing in itself, then the contradictory conflict of the two assertions is transformed into a merely dialectical conflict, and because the world does not exist in itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations) it exists neither as an in itself infinite whole nor as an in itself finite whole. It is only in the empirical regress of the series of appearances, and by itself it is not to be met with at all.
8
And in this way Kant believes he has provided an " […] indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of appearances".
9
The demonstrative nature of this argumentation is not denied by what Kant states about the inapplicability in philosophy of apagogical proofs, 10 which consist in proving "p" by showing that "non-p" leads to a contradiction. 11 The solution of mathematical antinomies, however, is not a reductio ad absurdum of one of the two horns of the antinomy, but consists rather in proving that both contrary propositions are false (as shown in the proofs of the antithesis and thesis respectively), and hence that the negation of their common assumption is true.
12
The discoverer of this procedure, which Kant calls the "sceptical method", was -according to Kant [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] ); in this case, therefore, the contradictory of both -i.e. that which denies both of them -is valid (cf. CAPOZZI, M. Kant e la logica, I. Naples, 2002, p. 577-580; see also HEIMSOETH, H. Transzendentale Dialektik, vol. IV, Berlin-New York, 1971, p. 736-739) . 13 In the passage here in question Kant does not refer to any of the arguments against movement, multiplicity, and divisibility, which had been traditionally ascribed to Zeno, and which he must have known through Bayle, who had set them out and discussed them in his Dictionnaire historique et critique (art.'Zenon d'Elée', note F). Scholars mostly refer (cf. HEIMSOETH, H., Transzendentale Dialektik, vol. II, Berlin, 1967, p. 302 ) to Plato's Phaedrus (261d), where Zeno is given the appellative 'Eleatic Palamedes', which Kant could have found in Bayle (note B). This reference, however, if it can explain the fact that Kant attributes the origin of the accusation that Zeno was a "sophist" to Plato (KrV, A 502/B 530), does not explain why Kant attributes these arguments to Zeno, since in the Phaedrus Zeno is credited with theories which, if we look at them carefully, are the exact opposite of those that are attributed to him in the passage from the first Critique: in the Phaedrus (261d) Zeno is presented as "such an artful speaker that his listeners will perceive the same things to be both similar and dissimilar, both one and many, both at rest and also in motion", that is to say as a sophist who had the absurd claim to deny two mutually contradictory propositions. 14 Cf. also MICHELI, G. Kant storico della filosofia. Padua, 1980, p. 128-142. 15 ARISTOTLE, De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia, ch. 3, if anything exists, it cannot have become, and he [i.e. Zeno according to Brucker] applies his conclusions to God. For that which has come into existence must have risen either from that which is similar or from that which is dissimilar. But neither of these is possible. For it is neither natural that like should be begotten by like, any more than that like should beget like (for the same features occur in all equal quantities and their interrelations are similar), nor is it possible that unlike has come into existence from unlike. For he argues that if the stronger could arise from the weaker or the greater from the less, or conversely the inferior from the better, the non-existent would arise from the existent, or conversely the existent from the non-existent; both of which are impossible. On these grounds then he claims that God must be eternal […] In the account Brucker took from the pseudo-Aristotelian work we find all the elements of the doctrine which Kant attributes to Zeno in the first Critique, that is to say the identification of being, and hence the world, with God, and the triple negation of the pairs of opposite predicates, finite-infinite, similar-dissimilar, and mobile-immobile.
as non-Being. If they were more than one they would be limited by each other. But the one is in no way similar to non-Being, or to the many […] . Again the one, of the type which he [i.e. Zeno] declares God to be, could neither move nor be immovable. For non-Being is immovable; for another thing cannot enter into its place, nor it into the place of another. It is only things more than one which move. For one thing must move into the place of another. But nothing could move into the place of non-Being; for non-Being has no place. If, then, they could change places, the one would be more than one […] . But the One can neither be at rest nor be moved; for it is similar neither to non-Being nor to the many. In all respects, then, God is of this kind, eternal and one […] , neither limited nor unlimited, neither at rest nor movable" (ARISTOTLE, Minor Works, trans. by W.S. Hett, Cambridge (Mass.), 1963, p. 483-486). 16 Actually, Fabricius, although on the basis of only one codex (and of the testimony of Sextus Empiricus), had already formulated the hypothesis that chapter 3 did not report Zeno's but Xenophanes' doctrines; however, Brucker rejected this proposal and continued to adhere to the traditional reading (cf. BRUCKER, I, p. 1170, note q); still in 1831, Bekker, in his edition of Aristotle, accepted the traditional -although certainly inexact -title of the work; on this work cf. ZELLER, E., MONDOLFO, R. La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico, parte I, vol. 3, ed. by G. Reale, Florence, 1967, p. 1-55. 17 As for the method that Kant attributes to Zeno, again in the passage from the first Critique, namely the "sceptical method", this seems to be the same method that Plato attributes to Zeno in the Parmenides, where he theorises the need for a rigorous dialectic analysis, carried out according to the method by hypothesis, that is to say, once a hypotheses has been made, to see not only those consequences which derive from its affirmation but also those that derive from its negation, both with respect to itself and with respect to the other elements of reality, taken in themselves and taken in relation to each other. 18 The passage from the Parmenides, together with Proclus' commentary on it, was quoted by Gassendi in the chapter "Logica Zenonis, seu Eleatica" of the 18 PLATO, Parmenides, 135e6-136b1: "What manner of training is that" he asked. "The manner is just what you heard from Zeno.
[…] But you must do the following in addition to that: if you want to be trained more thoroughly, you must not only hypothesize, if each thing is, and examine the consequences of that hypothesis; you must also hypothesize, if that same thing is not" "What do you mean?" he asked. "If you like," said Parmenides, "take as an example this hypothesis that Zeno entertained: if many are, what must the consequences be both for the many themselves in relation to themselves and in relation to the one, and for the one in relation to itself and in relation to the many? And, in turn, on the hypothesis, if many are not, you must again examine what the consequences will be both for the one and for the many in relation to themselves and in relation to each other. And again, in turn, if you hypothesize, if likeness is or if is not, you must examine what the consequences will be on each hypothesis, both for the things hypothesized themselves and for the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other […] [195] [196] . Darjes' textbook contains a short history of logic as an appendix, and entitled Meditationes in logicas veterum, which is taken, though without indicating the source, from a work by Gassendi. Kant certainly knew Darjes' textbook which he quotes on more than one occasion and uses in his lessons on logic as a source for the history of ancient logic (cf. Logik Dohna-Wundlacken, XXIV, p. 777); on Darjes see BERNET, C. Darjes, Joachim Georg, in Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon, Nordhausen, 2001, vol. XIX, p. 163-173. 21 PROCLUS, Commentaria in Platonis Parmenidem, 1000 35 .
Here, Proclus illustrates at length, and with a long example, the various ways in which the two initial hypotheses, "x exists" and "x does not exist", each generate twelve hypotheses, to give a total of twenty-four hypotheses. It is in practice a set of rules for obtaining consequences from given opposite hypotheses with the greatest of rigour.
Kant could see therefore in Zeno's method, the "Eleatica methodus", that is to say in the procedure illustrated in the Parmenides, a first example of that method of contrasting a thesis with its antithesis, rigorously deriving the consequences of opposite hypotheses, demonstrating thereby the truth of the contradictory proposition with respect to both horns of the antinomy, which was put into practice in the Antinomy of Pure Reason. The passage from the first Critique, which begins by defending Zeno from the accusation of having been a "wanton sophist", ends by stating that transcendental dialectic "does not favour scepticism", but on the contrary " […] it does favour the sceptical method, which can point to such dialectic as an example of its great services". 22 KrV, A 507/B 535. According to Kant, the "sceptical method" (or "zetetic method") must not be confused with scepticism; on the contrary, it represents the method proper to philosophy: "This method of watching, or rather provoking, a contest between assertions, not in order to decide it to the advantage of one party or the other, but to investigate whether the object of the dispute is not perhaps a mere mirage [Blendwerk] at which each would snatch in vain without being able to gain anything even if he met with no resistance -this procedure, I say, can be called the skeptical method. It is entirely different from skepticism […] . For the skeptical method aims at certainty, seeking to discover the point of misunderstanding in disputes that are honestly intended and conducted with intelligence by both sides […] . This skeptical method, however, is essentially suited only to transcendental philosophy, and can in any case be dispensed with in every other field of investigation, but not on this one" (KrV, (423) (424) . Analogously, with regard to the history of ancient philosophy, Kant distinguishes between "zetetics" and "academics": the former "suspended their judgement, and researched"; the latter "judged definitively that nothing can be demonstrated"; the former used doubt as a method of research, the latter transformed doubt into a dogmatic affirmation (cf. Storia delle storie generali della filosofia, ed. by G. Santinello, Padua, 1988, vol. 3, p. 923-927) .
